Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms

Juan Bárcena-Ruiz

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 1, 744-750

Abstract: By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semipublic firm) and that all the firms are equally efficient, then in equilibrium both firms hire managers.

Keywords: Mixed duopoly; Semipublic Firms; Managerial incentive contracts; Cournot competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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