Boundary and interior equilibria: what drives convergence in a ‘beauty contest'?

Andrea Morone and Piergiuseppe Morone ()

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 3, 2097-2106

Abstract: We present an experimental game in the p-beauty framework. Building on the definitions of boundary and interior equilibria, we distinguish between ‘speed of convergence towards the game-theoretic equilibrium' and ‘deviations of the guesses from the game-theoretic equilibrium'. In contrast to earlier findings (Güth et al., 2002), we show that (i) interior equilibria initially produce smaller deviation of the guesses from the game-theoretic equilibrium compared to boundary equilibria; (ii) interior and boundary equilibria do not differ in the timeframe needed for convergence; (iii) the speed of convergence is higher in the boundary equilibrium.

Keywords: Guessing game; p-beauty contest; individual behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-08-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Boundary and interior equilibria: what drives convergence in a ‘beauty contest’? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00296

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