A note on information of firms and collusion
Stefano Colombo ()
Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 2, 1603-1608
We study the effect of more information of firms about consumers' preferences on collusion sustainability within a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. We show that the increase of information may increase or decrease collusion sustainability, depending on the type of information involved (shared information or unshared information), on the characteristics of the information distribution, and on the product differentiation degree.
Keywords: Tacit collusion; Information; Horizontal differentiation; Hotelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00301
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