Antidumping Petition: To File or Not To File

Shih-Jye Wu (), Yang-Ming Chang and Hung-Yi Chen ()
Additional contact information
Shih-Jye Wu: National Sun Yat-Sen University
Hung-Yi Chen: Soochow University

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 631-643

Abstract: Given the “normal value” of a product as common knowledge in an import-competing market, the profitability of a home firm in filing an antidumping (AD) petition against its foreign rival is shown to depend on the marginal cost differential between the home and foreign firms. When the marginal cost differential is “significantly large,” the home firm's ability to put the foreign firm at the risk of an AD violation is limited. But when the marginal cost differential is “significantly small,” the home firm is able to increase its output and lower the price of the product below its normal value, putting the foreign firm in the situation of an illegal dumping. One interesting implication is that, relative to the case without an AD law, the home firm has a stronger incentive to undertake cost-reducing activities (e.g., R&D investment or the adoption of a more efficient technology) under the law.

Keywords: antidumping laws; antidumping duties; dumping margins (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-20
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P61.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00413

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().