Lindahl prices solve the NIMBY problem
Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti and
Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 3, 2457-2463
The siting of public facilities such as prisons or waste disposal facilities typically faces rejection by local populations (the "NIMBY" syndrome, for Not In My BackYard). These public goods exhibit a private bad aspect creating an asymmetry: all involved communities benefit from their existence, but only the host bears the local negative externality. We show that the well-known Lindahl pricing scheme constitutes the only cost-sharing method satisfying a set of properties specifically designed to handle the siting problem.
Keywords: Public Goods; Externalities; NIMBY; Location; Cost sharing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 R0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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