Plurality with run-off and triangulars

Abdoul Ndiaye

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 654-661

Abstract: In this paper we explore some aspects of the plurality rule with run-off, with respect to triangulars. Over the universal domain and under the impartial anonymous culture (IAC), we provide frequencies that (i) a triangular occurs, and (ii) a Condorcet winner - or a Condorcet loser - wins the election after a triangular. We also evaluate the likelihood of a triangular over the restricted domain of single-peaked preferences.

Keywords: Plurality with run-off; Triangulars; Impartial anonymous culture; Condorcet winner; Condorcet loser; Single-peakedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-23
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P63.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00569

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().