Power in the European Union: an evaluation according to a priori relations between states

Sébastien Courtin

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 534-545

Abstract: We analyze and evaluate the power of each member state of the European Union according to the different relations between them. To do that, we use power indices introduced by Andjiga and Courtin (2010) for games in which the players are organized into a priori coalition configurations. As a difference of games with coalition structure as introduced by Owen (1977) in games with coalition configuration, it is supposed that players organize themselves into coalitions not necessarily disjoint. We suppose that different coalitions formed between the states for two reasons: an economic reason (“the GDP per capita”); and a political reason, their attitude towards the European Union (“Euro-enthusiastic” and “Euro-skeptic”).

Keywords: Power indices; Coalition configurations; European Union. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Power in the European Union: an evaluation according to a priori relations between states (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00602

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