Two axioms for the majority rule

Antonio Quesada

Economics Bulletin, 2010, vol. 30, issue 4, 3033-3037

Abstract: Two axioms are shown to characterize the relative majority rule when preferences are defined over two alternatives. According to one axiom, if all the individuals in a group are indifferent, then the associated group preference is indifference. The second axiom states that a group S prefers alternative a to alternative b if and only if there is a subgroup T whose members unanimously prefer a to b and such that, if S ≠ T, indifference represents the preference of the group S/T.

Keywords: Social welfare function; relative majority rule; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2010/Volume30/EB-10-V30-I4-P279.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00680

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().