In search of a selfish central banker? a note

Eric Dehay ()
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Eric Dehay: University of Artois

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 493-498

Abstract: This paper extends the model of Chortareas and Miller (2003) to the case of a continuum of central banker types. We derive two main results. First, whether the central banker candidate is too selfish or not enough, he has the same incentive to accept the contract and to breach. Second, a too selfish central banker is more costly for society than a benevolent central banker.

Keywords: monetary policy delegation; contract; selfishness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00797

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