Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions

Katerina Sherstyuk

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 4, 2769-2776

Abstract: We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy's complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions.

Keywords: ascending auctions; complexity; finite automata; experimental evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C0 C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I4-P249.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00040

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().