Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate

Jérôme Serais (jerome.serais@unicaen.fr)
Additional contact information
Jérôme Serais: CREM UMR 6211 University of Caen

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 749-758

Abstract: In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election.

Keywords: Borda rule; Manipulation; Strategic candidacy; Similar candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P72.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00082

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley (j.p.conley@vanderbilt.edu).