Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness

Claudine Desrieux () and Jean Beuve
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Claudine Desrieux: ERMES and Laboratoire d''Economie du droit, University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 3, 2030-2040

Abstract: Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.

Keywords: Contractual incompleteness; Relational Contract; Reputation; Repeated Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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