Multiplicity of Equilibria in Multi-Unit Demand Sequential Auctions under Complete Information

Mohamed Jeddy () and Bruno Larue ()
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Mohamed Jeddy: CREATE, Université Laval
Bruno Larue: CREATE, U. Laval

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 1, 456-465

Abstract: We show that the result on the existence of a unique Nash perfect equilibrium in two-bidder multi-unit sequential second-price auctions under complete information (as in Krishna, 1993; Katzman, 1999; and Gale and Stegeman, 2001) is not robust in higher dimensional auctions. Using an example featuring three bidders competing for four objects, we found two equilibria characterized by different vectors of prices and allocations.

Keywords: sequential auctions; complete information; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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