Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?

Serge Blondel and Louis Lévy-Garboua

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 4, 3158-3168

Abstract: Many people vote in large elections with costs to vote although the expected benefits would seem to be infinitesimal to a rational mind. We exhibit two necessary conditions that a theory of rational decision must satisfy in order to solve the paradox. We then show that prospect and regret theories cannot solve it because each theory meets either one or the other necessary condition, but not both. However, the paradox of not voting is consistent with an amended version of third-generation prospect theory in which the reference is merely to vote or abstain.

Keywords: paradox of not voting; probability transformation; reference point; regret (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-18
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Related works:
Working Paper: Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting? (2011)
Working Paper: Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting? (2011)
Working Paper: Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting? (2011)
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