First-price vs second-price auctions under risk aversion and private affiliated values

François Maréchal ()
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François Maréchal: CRESE, University of Franche-Comté (France)

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 2, 1765-1771

Abstract: Under a specific informational framework, we compare the seller's expected revenue from a first-price auction and a second-price auction when bidders are risk averse and have private affiliated values.

Keywords: auctions; risk aversion; private affiliated values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06-16
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