An application of dynamic games with complete and perfect information to central asian water conflict resolution

Mirzosaid Sultonov

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 3, A30

Abstract: This paper uses dynamic games with complete and perfect information in solution of water conflict in Central Asia. The benefits and costs of the countries for their actions are modelled as payoffs for decision-makers within the frame of game theory concept. The equilibrium increasing the expected benefits, supporting rational use of water resources, contributing to preservation of political stability and environmental protection is identified. Confirmation of expediency of cooperation among countries of the region in long-term management of water resources is the main purpose of the paper.

Keywords: Central Asia; water conflict; game theory; dynamic games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Q0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I3-A30.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00468

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().