Revenue Equivalence in Sequential Auctions

Srobonti Chattopadhyay and Rittwik Chatterjee

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 1272-1281

Abstract: The revenue equivalence theorem is an widely known result in Auction Theory. This note generalize that theorem for the case of Sequential Auctions. Our results show that under a class of Sequential Auction, if an symmetric and increasing equilibrium bidding strategy exists, then the revenue equivalence still holds for that class of Sequential Auctions.

Keywords: Sequential Auction; Revenue Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-24
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