Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem

Doruk İriş () and Ipek Ozkal-Sanver ()

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 4, 2952-2958

Abstract: We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint.

Keywords: University-admission problem; Endowments; Manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10-19
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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