Collusion in Software Markets

Francisco Martínez-Sánchez

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 1345-1352

Abstract: In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on prices in software markets. We show that network externality hinders collusion. We also show that firms collude if they value future profits sufficiently.

Keywords: Collusion; Network Externality; Software Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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