Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology: comment
Min-Hung Tsay ()
Additional contact information
Min-Hung Tsay: Department of International Business, National Taiwan University, Taipei 106, Taiwan.
Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 1680-1686
In this comment, we show that the existence of the preemption equilibrium in Fudenberg and Tirole (Review of Economics Studies, vol. 52, PP. 383-401, 1985)'s continuous-time games of timing is not guaranteed under their assumptions.
Keywords: Dynamic Entry; Preemption; Rent Equalization; Technology Adoption; Timing Games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00700
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Series data maintained by John P. Conley ().