Advertised meeting-the-competition clauses: collusion instead of price discrimination

Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer () and Oliver Budzinski
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Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer: Bundeskartellamt

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 4, 3153-3157

Abstract: Pricing strategies may include the advertising of meeting-the-competition clauses (MCCs). We show in a specific spatial model scenario with differently informed consumers that MCCs primarily serve as a device to facilitate collusion instead of allowing for price discrimination between these consumers.

Keywords: meeting-the-competition clauses; advertising; price discrimination; competition; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M2 M3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-16
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I4-P285.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Advertised Meeting-the-Competition Clauses: Collusion Instead of Price Discrimination (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00704

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