Can Governments Reverse First-Mover Advantages of Foreign Competitors?
Armando Garcia Pires ()
Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 1527-1536
We show that governments can use export subsidies to reduce or even reverse the first-mover advantages of foreign competitors. In particular, if the cost disadvantage of Stackelberg followers relatively to Stackelberg leaders is not too large, the export subsidy makes the former produce more than the latter. Welfare unambiguously increases in countries with Stackelberg followers and in consumer countries, but decreases in countries with Stackelberg leaders. In turn, depending on the relative difference in cost competitiveness between leaders and followers, welfare can either increase or decrease in the world economy.
Keywords: Export Subsidies; First-Mover Advantages; Asymmetric Competitiveness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00788
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().