Symmetry vs. complexity in proving the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem

Uuganbaatar Ninjbat ()

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 1434-1441

Abstract: In this short note, we first provide two rather straightforward proofs for the Muller - Satterthwaite theorem in the baseline cases of 2 person 3 alternatives, and 2 person n ≥ 3 alternatives. We also show that it suffices to prove the result in the special case of 3 alternatives (with arbitrary N individuals) as it then can easily be extended to the general case. We then prove the result in the decisive case of 3 alternatives (with arbitrary N individuals) by induction on N.

Keywords: the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem; Monotone social choice functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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