A Proof for 'Who is a J' Impossibility Theorem

Alejandro Saporiti

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 1, 494-501

Abstract: In the analysis of group identification, Kasher and Rubinstein (1997), Logique Analyse 160, 385-395, have shown that any method to aggregate the opinions of a group of agents about the individuals in the group that posses a specific attribute, such as race, nationality, profession, etc., must be dictatorial or, otherwise, it must violate either consensus or independence. This result is known in the literature as 'Who is a J' impossibility theorem. This note enhances slightly the result by weakening the axiom consensus, and it offers a direct proof of the theorem based on the structure of the family of decisive coalitions.

Keywords: Self-determination; group identification; Arrow theorem; social choice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Proof for 'Who is a J' Impossibility Theorem (2011)
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