Comment on social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments

Alexander Smith ()
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Alexander Smith: Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI)

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 1, 923-931

Abstract: Fischbacher and Gaechter (AER, 2010) find that contributions decline in repeatedly played public good games because people are imperfect conditional cooperators who match others' contributions only partly. We re-examine the data using dynamic panel data methods and find that contributions also decline because people only partially match their own contributions from previous periods. We discuss possible interpretations.

Keywords: Public Goods; Conditional Cooperation; Dynamic Panel Data Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03-21
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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