Testing the slippery slope framework

Gaetano Lisi

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 2, 1369-1377

Abstract: The aim of this short paper is to empirically test the key hypothesis of the ‘slippery slope' framework, namely: (1) trust (in) and power (of) tax authorities are both necessary to guarantee a high level of tax compliance; (2) the interaction between trust and power, as well as voluntary tax compliance, are crucial for increasing overall tax compliance; (3) the possibility that a “slippery slope” situation occurs and then a reduction of power and/or trust below a certain critical level significantly reduces tax compliance. We find empirical support for all of these hypotheses. Furthermore, we also find that trust is more important than power.

Keywords: tax compliance; tax evasion; power and trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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