On the coincidence of the core and the bargaining sets

Josep M Izquierdo () and Carles Rafels ()
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Josep M Izquierdo: University of Barcelona
Carles Rafels: University of Barcelona

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 3, 2035-2043

Abstract: We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we sufficiently raise the worth of the grand coalition (the efficiency level). This coincidence result does not hold for other well-known bargaining sets like the Mas-Colell bargaining set and its variants.

Keywords: cooperative games; bargaining sets; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07-20
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