Characteristics of information transmission under uncertainty

Mariko Tanaka ()
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Mariko Tanaka: Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 3, 2629-2637

Abstract: This paper utilizes a sender-receiver game involving a government and infinite heterogeneous agents to analyze the characteristics of information transmission in an environment where a true state does not exist and coordination among various players is required. It shows that a message conveyed by the government induces agents to consider public opinion not through direct communication, but through expectations concerning the government's action. It also shows that the need for coordination, self-interest, and altruism enable the government to convey a more precise and credible message by decreasing the incentive to misrepresent information, whereas a perfectly altruistic government would always convey a precise message.

JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-23
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