Identifying defectors in a population with short-run players

Luciana Moscoso Boedo and Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 2, 1392-1403

Abstract: This paper considers a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game to explore how an information mechanism that labels defectors can help sustain cooperation in societies that include short-run players. We provide sufficient conditions under which there exists equilibria that sustain cooperation for different information technologies that identify defectors. We also analyze imperfect labeling mechanisms.

Keywords: short-run players; population game; labeling mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06-09
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