Efficiency in Bargaining Games with Alternating Offers

Vjollca Sadiraj and Juan Sun ()
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Juan Sun: Georgia State Univeristy

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 3, 2366-2374

Abstract: Bargaining games model situations in which the realization of potential benefits is jeopardized by conflicting bargaining powers. Most of the literature on bargaining behavior focuses on bargaining over gains. Exploration of behavior in situations under which agents bargain over losses has received only limited attention from the profession. An important question is whether the negative effect of competing bargaining powers on the efficiency of agreements is more severe in bargaining over gains or over losses. Another understudied research question is how the likelihood that the outcome of a negotiation will actually be implemented affects efficiency of bargaining. We design an experiment that addresses these two questions. We find that in alternating offers games, outcomes of bargaining over gains are more efficient than outcomes of bargaining over losses. We also find that the likelihood that an interaction is implemented has a positive effect on the efficiency of bargaining.

Keywords: Efficiency; Bargaining; Experiments; Payoff Protocols (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08-29
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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