A new Pareto efficient school choice mechanism

Yajing Chen ()
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Yajing Chen: Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 271-277

Abstract: This paper proposes a new school choice mechanism called the recursive Boston mechanism (RBM), which is similar to the well-known Boston mechanism. While the Boston mechanism considers the reduced problem of the original problem after removing students and their assignments in the previous step, RBM considers the subproblem. We show that RBM does not satisfy strategy-proofness and stability, but satisfies Pareto efficiency. Moreover, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the preference revelation game induced by RBM is equivalent to the set of stable matchings with respect to the true preferences of students.

Keywords: School choice; Recursive Boston mechanism; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-30
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