Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Contests with Endogenous Prizes

Shumei Hirai ()
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Shumei Hirai: Chuo University

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 4, 2744-2751

Abstract: This paper considers a contest with an endogenous prize, which is increasing in aggregate efforts of the players. Each player may have a different valuation of the prize and a different ability to convert expenditures to productive efforts. Under standard assumptions in the literature, we prove that there exists a unique pure Nash equilibrium in asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes.

Keywords: Contests; Endogenous prize; Existence and uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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