Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining

Derek Clark () and Jean-Christophe Pereau
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Derek Clark: Tromsø University Business School, University of Tromsø

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 3, 2522-2529

Abstract: We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.

Keywords: bargaining; successive monopoly; asymmetric response times. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-09
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Working Paper: Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining (2012)
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