Provision of a discrete public good with infinitely-many commodities

Francesco Ruscitti ()
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Francesco Ruscitti: John Cabot University, Department of Political and Social Sciences

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 28-34

Abstract: Suppose a group of individuals must decide whether to undertake a public project. The private commodity space, from which are also drawn the inputs for the public good, exhibits the Riesz decomposition property. We give a sufficient condition for the existence of a feasible provision of the public good that Pareto-dominates inaction. The condition is that the `net benefit' from the public project be positive. If this condition is met, by the Riesz decomposition property the cost of the project can be decomposed into a sum of individual contributions or taxes so that the project can be `financed' and every agent retains a positive surplus.

Keywords: Public goods; efficient provision; reservation price; ordered vector spaces; Riesz decomposition property. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-08
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