Unions' bargaining coordination in multi-unit firms

Domenico Buccella

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 217-225

Abstract: This paper investigates the patterns of bargaining in a multi-unit firm in the presence of labor unions coordination activities. It derives the bargaining regimes arising as sub-game perfect equilibria, considering both simultaneous and sequential games where parties choose whether to coordinate wage negotiations. It shows that unions' coordination costs may attenuate the conflict of interests between bargaining parties as regards the centralization level at which negotiations should take place.

Keywords: bargaining; multi-unit firm; labor unions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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