Super-majorites and collective surplus in one-dimensional bargaining: Numerical simulations

Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsatí ()
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Clara Ponsatí: Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica - CSIC

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 278-288

Abstract: This note presents numerical simulations computing quota rules that maximize collective surplus for populations choosing a one-dimensional policy through bargaining and voting. These computations are based on the characterization of the unique (asymptotic) equilibrium of Cardona and Ponsatí (2011). We show that under quadratic utility functions, the unique quota rule that maximizes collective surplus ranges from 80% to 95%.

Keywords: One-dimensional bargaining; single-peak preferences; quota rules; collective surplus. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-30
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