Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model with a commitment of no production
Stefano Colombo () and
Luigi Filippini ()
Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 3, 2122-2128
A typical result in patent licensing literature is that an insider patent-holder prefers licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee. However, when a commitment of no production is possible for the patent-holder, the result is reverted.
Keywords: Patent licensing; fixed fees; royalties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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