An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies

Katsuhiko Nishizaki ()
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Katsuhiko Nishizaki: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 300-308

Abstract: This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo, T., T. Sjostrom, and T. Yamato (2007) "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in discrete public good economies with quasi-linear preferences. We find that only constant social choice functions are securely implementable over the domains that satisfy partial dominance introduced in this paper. Partial dominance is a reasonable condition because the set of all strictly increasing and strictly concave valuation functions satisfies this condition.

Keywords: Secure implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Nash implementation; Strategy-proofness; Discrete public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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