Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players

Takashi Ui and Yasunori Yoshizawa ()
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Yasunori Yoshizawa: Yokohama National University

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 72-77

Abstract: This note considers Bayesian games with a continuum of players, symmetric quadratic payoff functions, and normally distributed signals. It shows that a recent result on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is implied by a classical theorem on teams by Radner (1962, Ann. Math. Stat. 33).

Keywords: unique linear equilibrium; Bayesian potential game; team. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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