The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates

Eric Kamwa

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 2, 967-972

Abstract: The Increasing Committee Size Paradox is a voting inconsistency that occurs under voting systems where voters cast exactly k votes when there are k seats to fill. This paradox occurs when, given an elected committee of size k, one of its member could not be elected if we were to elect a committee of size k + 1; even worse, the two committees may be disjoint. For three-candidate elections, we compute the likelihood of this paradox under the Impartial Anonymous Culture.

Keywords: Committee; Voting Paradox; Impartial Anonymous Culture; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04-05
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates (2013)
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