Acceptability prioritized preferences and equilibrium existence

Van Kolpin ()
Additional contact information
Van Kolpin: University of Oregon

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 1, 804-811

Abstract: Economic agents may sometimes find themselves in circumstances in which they are effectively endowed with preferences that place a priority on first meeting specific "acceptability standards" before attention can be placed on optimizing their "aspirational objective." We introduce the notion of acceptability prioritized preferences to model such situations and show that not only are these preferences generally discontinuous, but they can also fail to be characterizable by utility functions of any kind. Despite this fact, we establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence result for interactive environments whose populations include agents endowed with acceptability prioritized preferences.

Keywords: discontinuous games; multi-objective games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-20
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P79.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00896

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().