Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function

Yizhaq Minchuk

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 2, 1328-1332

Abstract: We study asymmetric first-price auctions with n bidders. We expand the results of Fibich et al. (2002) for asymmetric first-price auctions to a general utility function. We show that for low type bidders, the equality of equilibrium bids with symmetric, uniform distribution bids holds for the general case of a utility function. For high types of bidders, those with weaker distributions bid more aggressively than stronger bidders under mild assumptions of a utility function.

Keywords: asymmetry; first-price auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-03
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