Public Good Coalitions and Membership Exclusion

Fan-chin Kung

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 2, 1390-1395

Abstract: Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It is an extension of the Tiebout equilibrium in the long run when the number of coalitions can vary and membership exclusion is not granted.

Keywords: coalition; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-07
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