Monitoring in Tournaments

Jaesoo Kim (jaeskim@iupui.edu) and Jongwoo Park (jongwoo@bok.or.kr)
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Jongwoo Park: Bank of Korea

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 3, 1431-1437

Abstract: We show that less monitoring can increase effort and alleviate the moral hazard problem in tournaments. We also find a unique optimal level of monitoring based on contestants' abilities. As the difference between their abilities gets larger, the contest designer should monitor less.

Keywords: tournament; moral hazard; monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-08
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