Tullock contests under committee administration

Simiao Li ()
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Simiao Li: Hokkaido University, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Sapporo, Japan

Economics Bulletin, 2013, vol. 33, issue 3, 1983-1990

Abstract: Much of the Tullock contest (Tullock 1980) literature analyzes rent-seeking efforts under the assumption of a single prize administrator. Here, I allow a committee to decide the winner of the rent-seeking contest according to simple majority voting rule, and study the impact of committee size on rent-seeking expenditures. I find that increasing the size of the committee produces an ambiguous impact on total rent-seeking efforts, with the heterogeneity of the contestants acting as the factor determining a resultant increase or decrease in efforts.

Keywords: Committee Administration; Rent-seeking; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08-02
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