On the Use of Fines and Lottery Prizes to Increase Voter Turnout

John Duffy and Alexander Matros

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 2, 966-975

Abstract: We consider implementation issues regarding two mechanisms that have been used to increase voter turnout in elections: fines and lotteries. We focus on the amount of the fine or lottery prize needed to achieve full participation. We then propose a combined, self-financing mechanism by which the fines imposed on non-participants are used to finance the prize that is awarded by lottery to one of the individuals choosing to participate in voting. We argue that this combined mechanism has some advantages over the other two mechanisms and merits consideration.

Keywords: Voter turnout; Elections; Lotteries; Fines; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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