Does Foreign Media Entry Tempers Government Media Bias?

Hon Foong Cheah ()

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 1, 530-540

Abstract: Using a two period agency model similar to Morris (2001), I analyze the change in government media bias when individual public has access to an imperfectly informed news outlet. I found that while greater information availability reduces the government's benefit from lying -- as more information limits government's ability to influence. It also lower its cost -- as it limits future ability to influence reducing the government's incentive to build reputation. Both effects counteract one another, reducing the decrease in government media bias.

Keywords: Government control of media; media bias; independent media (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03-31
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