Multiplicity of Equilibrium Payoffs in Three-Player Baron-Ferejohn Model

Duozhe Li ()
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Duozhe Li: Chinese University of Hong Kong

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 2, 1122-1132

Abstract: This paper studies the three-player sequential bargaining game with a simple majority voting rule due to Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We show that there is a vast multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs, and that as the discount factor tends to one, the set of equilibrium payoffs evolves monotonically towards the entire feasible set. The multiplicity result can be easily extended to an interesting variant of the bargaining game, in which the responders only observe their own offers.

Keywords: Multilateral Bargaining; Majority Voting; Multiple Equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-25
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