Aggregating quasi-transitive preferences: a note

Dan Qin ()

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 2, 976-983

Abstract: To examine the consequences of allowing individual to violate full rationality in collective decision making, this article discusses the possibility of aggregating quasi-transitive preferences in the Arrovian framework. Quasi-transitive valued aggregating functions are discussed and characterised. A characterisation of the weak Pareto extension rule is also achieved as a corollary.

Keywords: preference aggregation; quasi-transitivity; veto power; Weak Pareto extension rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05-08
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