Majority Voting Over Lotteries: Conditions for Existence of a Decisive Voter

John Duggan ()
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John Duggan: U of Rochester

Economics Bulletin, 2014, vol. 34, issue 1, 263-270

Abstract: This note extends known sufficient conditions for existence of a decisive voter in pairwise voting over lotteries. The preferred lottery of such a voter always coincides with the lottery preferred by a majority, meaning voting can be reduced to a decision problem of the decisive voter. The results are useful in solving dynamic models of bargaining and elections, where a binary vote can be expressed as a choice between two lotteries (depending on the discount factor), and voting subgames can be reduced to a decision problem of the decisive voter.

Keywords: Voting; majority rule; radial symmetry; order restriction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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